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Abstract: Paul Romers radical idea of chartering cities to stimulate long run economic growth and development has
provoked a hot debate, not all supportive. Some of the opposition argues that the charter-city model is an antiquated
idea that conjures up brutal images of failed (neo)colonialism. This essay characterizes colonization, imperialism, and
colonialism in order to shed extra light on why and how effects of chartering a city are dissimilar to the effects of
colonization, imperialism, and colonialism. The characterization finds that while colonization, imperialism, and
colonialism share strong historical affinities, no such connections can reasonably be made to the charter-city idea. A
key assumption (requirement) of the charter-city model is voluntary participation of all players. Colonization,
imperialism, and colonialism were forceful and repressive systems which relied on both government cohesion and
administered prices, and were therefore inefficient. Monopoly gains (rents) from colonization, imperialism, and
colonialism came at the expense of reduced consumer surplus elsewhere. Success depended on monopoly rents from
the trade in objects. Under charter cities the potential benefits to the urbanization and the economic growth of
developing countries are huge. The charter-city model requires voluntary agreements. By overcoming the twin
problems of consensus building and commitment utilizing market mechanisms, charter cities generate gains from the
exchange of ideas. Evidence is starting to emerge suggesting that people understand that charter cities are not tentacles
of (neo)colonialism; they promise real benefits if only policy makers decide to break old rules.




The charter-city model of economic growth that Paul Romer (2010a, b, c) and his colleaguesat http://www.chartercities.org/ are promoting is in my view a welcome contribution to thegeneral economic theory of land that goes back to mercantilism, physiocrats, David Ricardo,
Thomas R. Malthus, Johann H. Von Thunen, and many others. While the objective of the model is
the long-run economic growth of developing countries, its general implications for land conservation
may well turn out to rival H. Hotellings 1931 paper. For example, if this model were applied to the
USA, just imagine the enormous possibilities for resource conservation, economies of scale, and
neighborhood externalities that would arise from relocating the whole U.S. population to one or two
of the fifty states. With a combined land area of 277,693.9 square miles, California and Arizona, for
example, could comfortably accommodate 1,116.4 persons per square mile. At the scale of Hong
Kongs 6,313 persons per square mile, the U.S. population could be housed in a 50-story structure
with each state occupying its own level (floor). Conceivably the fixed cost of that project would be
relatively low since the construction technology, engineering, and management are readily available.
Potential benefits are huge: vast areas of uninhabited land would open up; and efficiency gains from
energy use would increase national energy security. In fact, perfect substitution of fossil fuels by solar
and/or nuclear energy would become possible, and energy independence a reality. Earth becomes
Heaven.
The only obstacle that would prevent the building of the United States of Calizona is normative rules.
As Romer (2010a, p. 1) puts it, 
In this century, new technologies can raise living standards at the fastest rate in human
history. To careful observers, this much has been clear for some time. Whats new is the
recognition that it will happen only if our rules keep up with our technologies and the
proliferating web of human interactions that these technologies make possible. The constraint
we will face will come from neither scarce resources nor limited technological opportunities;
if we falter, it will be because of our limited capacity for discovering and implementing new
rules.  
Superficially, in the USA today the benefits from the current rules status quo are greater than the cost
of implementing new and untested rules. In many developing countries by contrast the case for
charter cities stands to generate greater benefits than costs; advocating for the change and
implementation of new rules is not unreasonable. Yet, a frequent criticism against the charter-city
model of economic growth of developing countries is that it reminds some people of colonialism (see
http://www.chartercities.org/blog). What is the basis for this reaction? This essay explores that
question.
Since the question of colonization and its aftermath is really a question of land, its value, and
surrounding issues, the essay begins with a general summary of the key ideas about land. The
summary is more indicative than instructive of the issues. The third section of the essay outlines
classical theories of colonization, drawing up the works of E.G. Wakefield, Adam Smith, and Karl
Marx. It indicates the links between the theories of colonization and the broad themes of economic
3imperialism, colonialism, and national ideology (nationalism). In all these, the scope of the discussion
very general. Given the understanding of the third section, I contrast the charter-city model to
colonialism, and make a concluding remark.
2. Motivation
One exciting aspect of the charter-city model is that it reintegrates the role of land in economicgrowth theory, and thereby extends Paul Romers (1990, 1993) new growth theory in creativeways (cf. Jones and Romer, 2010). The reintegration is good news, because neoclassical
theory has assigned a unit parameter to the impact of land on production on an old assumption that
the supply of land is fixed. Essentially, land plays a minor and fixed role in the neoclassical theory of
economic growth and development. The assumption itself, while it enables elegance, breaks with
economic history. For example, the mercantilist school of thought considered land the sole source
of prosperity.  National wealth came from the accumulation of land, classically defined to include gold
and silver, and a surplus trade balance. A nation poor of gold and silver had to sell whatever trinkets
it had to acquire gold and silver if it hoped to be rich. In this case a good trade policy supported
tariffs on imports and promoted subsidies on exports. Trade was a zero-sum gain.
Laissez faire physiocrats were anti-mercantilists. To them the value of land was its agricultural use,
and national wealth is a direct function of productive work (agricultural labor) of agricultural land.
The importance of land explained Quesnays Tableau economique and Turgots support for farmers
self-interest and private property as motivations and preconditions for high productivity and
diminishing returns as a limit to productivity. At the time the general understanding was that
reinvestment of profit in capital accumulation was the only sure way of preventing (at the least
postponing) diminishing productivity. This is a familiar line of literature to deserve further attention.
Another familiar and related vein of literature suggests that the Malthusian absolute check on
economic growth is clearly physiocratic in its origin. Malthuss two postula indicate that
diminishing returns are a permanent and unavoidable curse. For Ricardo scarcity and diminishing
returns are relative so that the demands on the limited supply of land of increasing population put but
manageable upward pressure on rent, even without significant capital accumulation and given unequal
quality of land. Obviously under the charter-city model of gigantic (Hong Kong) scale, rent on
agricultural land would decline while that of urban land would increase. Since in many arid lands
agricultural lands is of a poor quality to begin with, turning it into urban land (charter cities) would
increase its price (rent).
Other implications of the charter-city model for the von Thunen rent are huge as evident from  von
Thunen land rent (Ri) expressed as
where Ri is ith land rent, Yi is gross yield from the ith amount of land, Pi is the price of the ith
(1)
4product, Ci is the cost of producing the ith product, Fi is the freight rate of the ith product to the
market, and Mi is the distance from the source of Yi to the market.
Now, suppose Yi is a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function of capital (Ki), and human
capital (Hi), given some level of technology (Ai), i.e.,  Letting
for qi the quality of the population Ni as measured by things like health, education, job seniority, and
so on, then for  (1) becomes
 For a 50-story Calizona, Mi is Pythagorean, i.e.,
where xi is the height of the ith State (level) in the 50-story Calizona and yi is the horizontal distance
from the structure to some source of the ith product. Hence, per capita Ri becomes
This gives the gist that the charter-city model has wide-ranging implications not only for the economic
growth of developing economies, but for the role of land in economic growth of all countries. Now
to get back to the point of this essay, let us characterize the processes of colonization, imperialism.
3. Colonization, Imperialism, and Colonialism
Literally, to colore is Latin for inhabiting a place for agriculture. However, there have been manydifferent characterizations of colonization.





5A definitive scheme of what may be called conservative classical colonization was first outlined by
E.G. Wakefield (1849[2001]), and it is also known in the literature as systematic colonization or
assisted colonization (Archer, 2003, Kittrell, 1973, 1966, 1965). Of course, colonization occurred
long before Wakefield. From Adam Smiths Wealth of Nations it is clear that ancient Greece had
colonies undertaken to relieve the mother-city states from population and food pressure. The colonies
were treated like the emancipated child ... [who is] at all times entitled to great favor and assistance,
... yet ... [over] whom [the mother] pretended to claim no direct authority or jurisdiction (p. 523,
cf. Kittrell, 1973). Roman colonies satisfied demand for land and were representatives of the mother-
city. Todays modern cities like London (Londinium) and Cologne (Colonia Claudia) were Roman
colonies (Wikipedia). From this history it is clear that classical colonization exported capital and/or
labor to the colonies and repatriated profit to mother-cities.
Technically, systematic colonization differed from classical colonization in that it was one of the
largest mercantalist vent-for-surplus schemes. The British version of it sought to transfer surplus
capital and population to the colonies to create wealth for Britain. As Kittrell (1973) puts it,
Wakefields technique of colonization was embodied in [the] arguments for the sale of colonial lands
at an artificial price sufficiently restrictive as to preclude an uneconomical and fatal dispersion of
settlers in the land-abundant colonies (p. 87). The scheme required money payment for colonial
lands. The size of land was of the size that it could not be subdivided and resold. The landowner was
liable for a land tax, with tax revenue going to fund the emigration of laborers to the colonies, and
whatever was left to offset other colonial administration costs to make the colonies self-supporting
 ( http://www.australiangenealogy.org/history/wakefields_scheme_colonization.htm). To accomplish
all that, the scheme proposed to manage supply of and demand for labor, such that capitalists could
earn profit and laborers have well-paying jobs. The scheme favored emigration of young people of
both sexes and in proportions that encouraged married family life, and that those who assisted
emigration be compensated somehow.
At the time schematic colonization was a controversial innovation much like Romers charter cities.
Although most contemporary political economists agreed with the general framework of systematic
colonization, some called Wakefields idea crazy, simplistic, and more, as far as Karl Marx was
concerned. The same adjectives are being used today about charter-cities, not that the two schemes
are the same. Wakefields the main problem had to do with determining the land price that was both
sufficient and restrictive. He had no good answer for that question, but neither had his critics. He
suggested that the price be just right - not too low and not too high. Too high of a price would
encourage substitution of high quality land for low quality land with the effect of diverting
settlements to costly lands (p. 91). Too low of a price would encourage slavery, as every free
person would become a landowner. Thus, a goldilocks price would be a sledding function of local
wage rate, cost of living, land fertility, and climate. The reasonableness of a positive price for land
was never in question; it is the restrictiveness of the price that bothered many for it suggested creating
inefficiencies by concentrating the supply of an abundant resource and charging a restrictive price for
it.  This is the part of systematic colonization that received the sharpest and most deserved criticisms
(see Kittrell, 1973, pp. 90-91), and that may have limited the influence on economics of Wakefields
scheme.
6Systematic colonization, while it may have succeeded in financing some emigration, failed to re-create
a model society or generate huge profits for either capitalists or the mother-country. In regard to the
former, systematic colonization elevated immigrant laborers to a higher status in colonies than they
would in the mother-country, something the upper classes did not take kindly to. With respect to the
latter, presumably, laborers preferred to be landowners themselves, and  presented competition for
land, which, by also reducing the supply of labor (increasing wages) lowered profit, and questioned
the efficacy of assisted colonization. These were the same effects Wakefield wanted to address in the
same place.
Wakefields solution was a practical response to the failure of colonies such as Swan Bay (Australia,
1829). These failures suggested that spontaneous, unregulated colonization would not develop in
colonies where free men could easily become landowners themselves. Competition for land would
mean that the labor supply would fall, wages rise, and capital productivity fall with an increase in K/L
ratios. This motivated the colonial government to grab land away from the conquered natives and sell
it to the colonists for the benefit of the mother-country and monopolies.
According to the charter-city model the host voluntarily leases a sizeable piece of land for the charter
city (see http://chartercities.org/faq/11/faq). Thus, the model focuses on transferring to hosts growth-
enabling rules and institutions that govern them in contrast to systematic colonization which
emphasized the emigration of population from, and immigration of wealth into, the mother-country,
with little to no added value to the colonies.
The rights to land ownership are fundamental rights; the struggle for land is inseparable from the
struggle for freedom. This is precisely why such a struggle almost always led to nationalism, and in
most cases to independence soon thereafter. American independence was a land victory; Paul
Romers experience with Madagascar described by Mallaby (2010) is another example of the sensitive
nature of the land issue and the emotions that it invokes. It all suggests that for the charter-city model
to get off to a good start there is a need for a strong and legitimate host leadership. However, there
is also a trade-off between too strong a government and other essential values like democracy. Lazy
thinking (lol) insists that democracy is good for all, all the time, in all places. Romers recognition that
democracy is not always everything to everyone, reminds me of J. Bhagwatis (1958) classic
immiserizing growth; not so much because it raises a question about whether there is such a thing
as growth/development-enhancing dictatorships or that development is freedom as Amartya Sen
(1999) suggests, but because democracy may be a consequence of economic growth and development
instead  (cf., Brown, 2000).
A recognition that democracy may not be the means to which growth and development are ends does
not mean that rules cannot be invented and implemented where democracy is weak or absent. China
is still not a democratic country; however the Western basis for her rapid growth today has been in
the making for sometime, see, e.g., Teng and Fairbank (1970), Bonavia (1982), and Gasster (1983).
Moreover, much of East Asia has become more democratic with rapid growth than it was without
it. For the most part rules that work already exist somewhere, and many may well be neo-medieval
as Mallady suggests of charter cities. However, the spread and implementation of ideas appear to
7have been frustrated by the dogmatic belief in a geography that promotes the distrust of foreigners
on one hand, and the supposedly incorrigibility of the native on the other hand (cf., Booth, 2007).
Today many countries use similar rules only differently, and the difference in use has meant the
difference in performance. For example, Zimbabwe relies heavily on the U.S. dollar ($) and currency
market to deal with the hyperinflation of its economy denominated in the countrys local currency
(Z$). North Korea apparently specializes in forging US$. At the same time both countries are
vehemently opposed to the US economic system and seemingly its rules. Again, what that means is
that just like in a war where the use of weapons and ammunition captured from the enemy may well
decide who wins the next battle, ideas developed in democracies often work in non-democracies as
well ( See Romer, 2010c).
3.2 Liberal colonization
It is true that systematic colonization was not really an economic theory; it was rather a practical
technique. However, there is sufficient evidence of its basis in the liberal philosophical tradition of
Bentham, Ricardo, Mill, Locke, and even Smith. For example, the connection of assisted
colonization, and Benthamians and Ricardians is well documented, not in the least that Wakefield
corresponded with Bentham (Kittrell, 1965). The difference is that all economic liberals at the time
had faith in unrestrained competition in trade (Ricardians) and unregulated competition of ideas
(Millians) within a self-interested framework (Smith, Bentham, and so on). However, for the
Benthamian-Ricardians the quantity of capital, rather than the size of land, determined the volume
of trade. In this view colonies are leeches of capital from the mother-country, although Bentham later
retracts this view.
Wakefield appealed to Adam Smiths authority on the relationship between capital and profit in the
process of growth. However, the theoretical tie between the two on the issue of colonization has been
pretty loose. One can say that Smith could not have supported systematic colonization as it was
against his Invisible Hand idea. He argued, for instance, that American colonies were founded in
error after Columbus mistook America for East India. Only the presence of gold and silver later
attracted the interest of the Council of Castile to the idea of colonizing America. But even then the
growth of colonies depended on cheap and fertile land, good knowledge and government of colonies,
high wages and profit, and population control. Thus, the American colonies grew faster than other
imperial colonies because their institutions were more favorable to improvement (p. 539), as
opposed to the absolute government of Spain, of Portugal, and in less degree of France, [which] are
even more violent in the colonies than at home (p. 552). Hence, continental Europe contributed
little (p. 556) to the productivity and well-being of colonies, concluded Smith.
On the other hand colonies contributed to Europe by increasing employment and reducing
overcrowding, extending the market size through zero-sum gains from trade, as the mother-country
and sectors with monopoly power gained at the expense of other countries. Consequently domestic
investment fell, and Smith concluded that monopoly is bad, but trade itself is good (p. 573), so that
government support to monopoly was not good for the country either. He insisted that the policy
of the monopoly is a policy of shopkeepers - not country (p. 579). Thus, in Smiths mind the
8Columbian exchange was an unequal exchange (Cf. Nunn and Qian, 2010) by which colonization
exported mainly diseases to the colonies; formed unequal social relations with the natives of
colonies, exploited both natives and migrant laborers; enslaved mainly Africans; and promoted
miscegenation, genocide, imperial colonialism, dependency and neo-colonialism all at much higher
opportunity costs than the benefits of the infrastructure, medical advancement, and technology it
delivered. Hence, liberals opposed colonization and advocated for the liberation of all colonies,
because self-determination was good for the mother-country, good for the colonies, and bad for
monopoly merchants. Again, to Adam Smith the discovery of America and the Cape passage has
exalted the mercantile system (p. 591), which led to monopoly and colonization at the cost to the
mother-country, and represented transitory [monopoly] profit and permanent revenue of the
sovereign (p. 602). Since exclusive companies are a nuisance (p. 600), the evil comes from the
system [of colonization], not from the character of the men who administer it (p. 602).
3.3 Marxist Opposition to Colonization
Marxists viewed any form of colonization as a disparate form of exploitation and social change. Karl
Marx himself reserved his harshest ridicule for Wakefields systematic colonization as Chapter 33 on
the modern theory of colonization (pp. 838-848) in Capital clearly shows. In his viewpoint
systematic colonization is primitive accumulation of capital (p. 846). It is a vain attempt to export
capitalism to colonies to offset its declining rate of profit in the industrial nations of Europe. The
attempt will not work because, argued Marx, 
property in money, means of subsistence, machines and other means of production,
does not as yet stamp a man as a capitalist if there be wanting the corrective - the
worker, the other man who is compelled to sell himself of his own free-will. He
[Wakefield] discovered that capital is not a thing, but a social relation between
persons, established by the instrumentality of things (p. 839).
For systematic colonization to work, the worker must be willing to self-expropriate - i.e., not want
to own land or capital, only labor. All this, according to Marx, proved that the capitalist mode of
production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property, all have their fundamental
condition in the annihilation of self-earned private property, in other words, the expropriation of the
laborer (p. 848).
3.4 Colonization to Imperialism
There is no question that Karl Marx understood that capitalism was the most productive economic
system. He and Frederick Engels wrote in The Communist Manifesto (1846) that
 during its rule of scarce[ly] one hundred years, [capitalism] has created more
massive and more colossal productive forces than all preceding generations together.
Subjection of Natures forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry
and agriculture, steam-navigation, railway, electric telegraphs, clearing the whole
9continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole population conjured of the
ground - what earlier centuries had even a presentiment that such productive forces
slumbered in the lap of social labour? 
They (Marx and Engels) attributed labor productivity to technological progress. Yet, in Capital
(1906) Marx expected capitalism to collapse under its own weight as profits declined. He anticipated
unregulated colonization to fail and Wakefields assisted colonization was proof that capitalism was
indeed failing. In this assessment, as it turned out, Marx was in correct, and it took other Marxists,
like V.I. Lenin, to patch up the logical holes in Marxs theory, and soothe unmet expectations. 
Fundamentally, Lenin (1965) was even more unclear than Marx because he did not distinguish
colonization from colonialism. However, for him (Lenin) colonization transformed free capital into
monopoly capital by replacing large-scale by still larger-scale industry, and carrying concentration
of production and capital to the point where out of it has grown and is growing monopoly: cartels,
syndicates and trusts, and merging with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks, which manipulate
thousands of millions (pp. 105 - 107).
The concept of imperialism, albeit difficult to explain, is a direct consequence of colonization as Ken
Boulding and Tapan Mukerjee (1972) show in their edited collection of essays, Economic
Imperialism. A precise definition of imperialism is elusive, but it is generally understood that
imperialism is an unequal and domineering relationship between one nation and another. While there
have been many empires across world history, modern imperialism is recent and is characterized
mainly by the domination of non-European peoples by European nations for economic and political
reasons. Access to resources and markets was a major economic reason for imperialism; racial
superiority was a major political reason for imperialism ( see  J.A. Hobson, 1901). It made it easy to
claim that the locals did not understand, and therefore misused, valuable lands. The locals
undervalued and misused lands because they were inferior, and it made sense further to take the land
away from them.
3.5 Imperialism to Colonialism 
Again, colonization led to imperialism and imperialism gave birth to colonialism. Colonization was
a process of forming a colony - people and other animals, big and small, did colonize. Colonialism
on the other hand was colonization PLUS, the PLUS included unequal rule of the colonizers over the
colonized. Colonialism preached profit-making, impoverished others, and  propagated European
religious and other values (Osterhammel, 1997). Whereas in settler colonialism a large population of
settlers took over native fertile land for agriculture, in exploitation colonialism a few settlers took
over land with the aim of exploiting the land and its people on behalf of the metropole (mother-
country). Both forms of colonialism were old; new was the colonialism by Western Europe of non-
European lands. 
3.6 Colonialism to Neo-Colonialism and Beyond
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Colonialism was related to imperialism in that a colony is a part of an empire. In that limited sense
capitalism enabled colonization; colonization led to Western imperialism, which established
colonialism and expanded capitalism. From Marxists viewpoints colonialism was an extension of
capitalism. V.I. Lenin went as far as claiming a joint-causation in which colonialism is the cause of
imperialism, and imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism.  Such a viewpoint rendered
support to the right of all peoples to self-determination, which someone else might say opened the
door to Soviet imperialism and Japanese imperialism.
Marxists were not alone in their opposition to colonization, imperialism, and colonialism. Liberal
economists going back to Adam Smith, Frederic Bastiat and others, also disagreed with many forms
of restrictions on markets and the individual. They argued that such practices were costly to both the
colonies and the metropole. The negative impacts of colonization, imperialism, and colonialism on
their subjects were horrific: dispossession, exploitation, slavery, neocolonialism and dependency. In
the end the health, food security, and slave trade impacts of these processes have all been unequal
(Nunn, 2008, Nunn and Qian, 2010).
The effects of colonialism have lingered on to neo- and post-colonialism. Edward Said (1978, 1998)
traced orientalism to imperialism. Saids reading of social history is not entirely without a basis. Asia,
generally speaking, reacted to Western imperialism by imitating its techniques, adopting its ideas of
progress and freedom. In particular China strengthened itself by introducing rail and port
infrastructures, and improving its armaments, and its metal and textile mills. Japan copied the
Western universal education system, and foreign industrial, scientific, and military expertise. India
introduced the Western system of higher education for the urban elite, while Indianizing its
government. Thus, while the extent of post-colonial effects of imperialism remain debatable, their
existence does indeed favor Saids thesis (cf. Booth, 2007, Gasster, 1983, Teng and Fairbank, 1970).
Elsewhere, but in a related area, Frantz Fannons The Wretched of the Earth (1961) and Black Skins,
White Masks (1952) represented other summaries of the lingering effects of imperial colonialism.
Here the consequence of colonialism was neo-colonialism of which only a certain consciousness could
cure. The anticolonial national ideologies that emerged in the 1950s onwards were outward
expressions of that consciousness.
To sum: Colonization enabled imperialism, which enabled a colonial ideology called colonialism.
Opposition to colonialism gave rise to nationalism which sparked the process of decolonization (See
Paul E. Sigmund, 1972). Whereas national ideologies were successful in bringing about some political
freedoms, their effects on national economies have remained questionable as Harry G. Johnson (1967)
clearly characterized (cf. Amavilah, 2008a, b). Part of the difficulty stemmed from the fact that many
national ideologies were not anchored in good economic theory (if in any theory at all), but also
because the process of decolonization itself came to mean different things to different people.
Historian Raymond F. Betts (1997) has observed that the meaning of decolonization changed from
the liberation of colonized countries to encompassing changes of attitudes and mentality in both
[formerly colonizing and colonized] communities (p. 3). With that change it has become nearly
impossible to assess progress made.
2For the definition of host, source, and guarantor, and their interactions see  
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4. The Charter-city Idea
The preceding sections characterized colonization, imperialism, colonialism, and associatedissues. Looking back at the main themes of that characterization, it is easy to see why somesuspect the charter-city model of (neo)colonialism. In this section I briefly assess whether the
idea of charter-cities is (neo)colonial and what its general implications might be for African countries
particularly.
4.1 Is the Charter-City Idea a (Neo)Colonial Idea?
From the historical perspective there is a huge difference of both form (structure) and content (goal)
between colonialism and charter cities as models of economic growth and development. Paul Romers
(2010b) breakthrough idea in the charter-city model is the proposition that
Today many countries are stuck with rules that slow down inflows of technology,
prevent successful urbanization, and stifle personal ambition. They need new rules that
will let their citizens take full advantage of mutually beneficial exchange with millions
of fellow citizens and with people and firms from around the world. Those rule could
be introduced by chartering new cities like Hong Kong. ... Many nations need to
change rules. ... Charter cities - ... - could be the skunkworks that bring systematic
change to entire nations (pp. 10-11). 
Charter cities can serve as agents of change. Why? - because they can deal effectively with two
related challenges that stand in the way of rule-making and rule-implementation. Chartercities.org
calls the two challenges the challenge of building a consensus and the the challenge of
commitment. Because it always takes time to initiate large projects, one good thing about that is that
consensus building reduces error about the process implementation. The bad thing is that the long
time lag slows the process itself down, and systematic colonization was imposed  to speed up or
circumvent the consensus building process, but it ended up with an inefficient land pricing scheme
which redistributed surpluses. The charter-city model imports rules (ideas) then uses the market
mechanism to implement them. From the perspective of the host, the market mechanism requires
voluntary participation, which allows for social efficiency in the pricing of rules. Here Romer gives
the Stockholm approach to internalizing congestion cost as an example. Systematic colonization did
not permit voluntary exchange of land, and therefore its pricing method was inefficient from the very
start. Charter cities shorten the process of consensus building; complying with the rules is voluntary
- an opt-in or opt-out. The host, who can also be the source simultaneously, remains in charge of
the polity and its structures; the guarantor is in charge of enforcing the rules.2
The second challenge in making charter cities relevant in a way that distinguishes them from
colonization, imperialism, and colonialism is the commitment challenge.  Historical experience
proves that contract breaches and regime switches have been major problems in advancing
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development projects in developing economies. For further evidence review League of Nations and
United Nations mandates, e.g., the example of Britain, South Africa, and Namibia. Charter cities
minimize the challenge of commitment by leveraging the institutional credibility of partner
government(s), which facilitates adherence to new rules. Sticking to rules enables risk-sharing
among stakeholders. Average country and political risks fall and investment rises. Again, this aspect
of charter cities differs from colonialism, for example, because colonists were foreigners pursuing
foreign self-interests. Under the charter-city model the only foreigners are guarantors whose sole
objective is neutral enforcement of contracts between host (and source, if one entity) and investors
who may be foreign or local. In other words, the charter-city model characterizes trade in ideas
(rules), which neither colonization, imperialism, nor colonialism ever did.
4.2 Charter-Cities and the Neo-colonization of African Countries?
Colonization was both unfair and unavoidable. As they emigrated from prehistoric Africa, along the
way, humans claimed as their own areas that once belonged to someone or something. We are (at
least we were) all colonizers. In Southern Africa the Bantu people colonized the lands of the native
people, the Khoi San people (so-called Bushmen). Northward emigration into Europe and beyond
displaced someone or something; it is unthinkable that these lands were empty. More recently
Western Europeans colonized everyone, as the examples of Africa, the Americas, and Australia and
New Zealand clearly demonstrate.
In the massive edition of The Economics of Colonialism Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann (1975)
describe the effect on economic growth of Africa and its European colonizers of colonialism  - see
also reviews by Rimmer (1978) and Beverige (1977). Some of the pieces in the volume argue that
the expansion and maintenance of imperial colonialism depended on purely economic forces, such as
the search for new markets and sources of material supplies. Taken to the extreme this argument
suggests that colonialism was all about exploitation. Other entries in the same book reason that
colonialism was a modernizing agent - a good thing (cf. Herskovits and Harwitz, 1964). While it
would be nearly impossible to assess the net balance of all these, Patrick Manning (1974) has given
an indicative analysis of the costs and benefits of colonialism. Among the benefits he listed (1) gains
from trade with the mother-country; (2) transfer of technical advances; (3) foreign investment; (4)
mother-country government expenditures on colonies; (5) taxes; (6) introduction of money and
monetary systems; (7) regulatory systems; (8) formal education; and (9) law and order. However, one
could as easily list the benefits as the costs of colonialism.  For the native peoples law and order  was
actually political coercion and repression; high taxes meant loss of land, and so on. Dramatically put,
it is not clear what the net benefit were of saving a sick native from death only for him or her to live
five years longer in abject poverty and deprivation. In the end whether colonialism was net beneficial
or net costly depends on the type of colonialism, the colonizer, and the colonized country (cf. Brown,
2000, Souza, 2011). This is not just theory: Anne E. Booth (2007) tells us that East and Southeast
Asias development was spurred by rapid urbanization caused by land scarcity following population
explosion in the 1900-1940 decades. The economics of high population density necessitated high
agricultural productivity per acre and uplifted the natives. In Japan where such productivity was
highest it led to global Japanese imperialism and as a reaction to it nationalism in Japan and
13
neighboring countries.
African countries bore the burden of imperial colonialism - there is no doubt about that one! A unified
policy as Frannie Leautier (2011) recently pointed out is the way for them to go. Yet unity also
requires functioning (democratic) institutions. At the dawn of independence both Kwame Nkhurumah
and Julius Nyerere wanted African unity. However, both were similarly cautious about how that could
be done with African countries so much differentiated institutionally. Nyerere in fact wanted
independence for Tanzania delayed to make it easy for Tanzania and other East African countries to
emerge as one after they gained their independence (Rothschild and Curry, 1978, cf. Amavilah, 1995).
To date regional integration in Africa remains elusive, despite the talks. Because modern cities are
cosmopolitanically homogenous, charter cities will in fact provide stepping stones for integration
which so far has been difficult to achieve.
Charter cities are not only not colonialism, the idea itself is timely. The rate of urbanization is ever
rising. Estimates indicate that a third of people in developing countries lives, or is making efforts to
live, in cities. Many will surely end up in slums. Charter cities reframe the role of traditional cities
as destinations of unstoppable urbanization to cities as sources of ideas, creativity, and social
progress. They are practical complements of the UN-Habitats goal of Harmonious Urbanization
( see Anver Versi, 2008). Better (charter) cities would (a) promote orderly urbanization and reduce
poverty, (b) downgrade and eventually eliminate slums, © increase community participation and
create more and better ideas, (d) finance urbanization, (e) improve local governance (cf. Ernest
Harsch, undated), and (f) address women and gender inequality issues, according to Mapetla and
Schlyter (2009). These are things we now know for sure colonization, imperialism, and colonialism
just could not do!
5. Concluding Remark
This essay characterizes colonization, imperialism, and colonialism as modes of progress andcontrasts them to Paul Romers charter-city model of economic growth and development. Theobjective is to magnify the differences and shed one more ray of light on the efficacy of the
charter-city model. While the characterization is very general, perhaps even silly and superficial, it
finds that colonization, imperialism, and colonialism are historically interlinked. One needed colonies
to build an empire and a colonial ideology (colonialism) to rule the colonies. No such link can
reasonably be made with the idea of chartering a city to promote economic growth and development.
A key difference is that the isms were forced and therefore inefficient systems. Their short-lived
success was unsustainable as it depended on government support and monopoly rents from trade in
objects. The charter-city model requires voluntary agreements as a matter of internalizing an
externality. It overcomes the twin problems of consensus building and commitment, utilizing market
mechanisms. In this situation markets themselves must be established first, but thereafter socially-
efficient solutions obtain and represent gains from trade in ideas. This case is a classic application
of Coase Theorem in which negotiation can lead to efficiency (irrespective of property rights) as long
14
as the number of parties to the negotiation is small so that transaction costs are low (Coase, 1960).
If there is another thing that would slow down the process, it would be principal-agent trust/mistrust,
which would depend on the country. This is one reason Romer has hinted to Scandinavian countries
and Finland, and Canada as preferable guarantors, given their neutral recent history and minimum
participation in colonization, imperialism and colonialism. Already it is satisfying to learn from
http://www.chartercities.org/blogs) that Honduras has shown interest in the project. This goes to
show that people understand that charter cities are not tentacles of (neo)colonialism; they understand
that charter cities promise real benefits if only policy makers decide to break old rules.
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